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There  exist  congenital diseases  that reduce newborns' potential  opportunities. This 
reduction is sometimes alleviated if the congenital disease is early detected thanks to a 
newborn  screening  program.  We  propose  an  outcome  measurement  of  newborn 
screening programs based on the opportunity gains they offer. We show that, under 
plausible assumptions, the ranking of the available screening programs for a particular 
disease, according to this new outcome measurement, do not depend on the metric of 
opportunity. We also apply our model to the current debate about choosing between a 
selective  or  a  universal  newborn  hearing  screening  program  to  detect  congenital 
hearing impairment. 
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 1 Introduction
One of the most ￿ ourishing areas within health economics is the one that
concerns equity in the delivery of health care (see Wagsta⁄and van Doorslaer,
2000; Williams and Cookson, 2000; and the literature cited therein). The
word ￿equity￿usually refers to the distributive justice in the allocation of a
commodity (￿health care￿in this case). The underlying motivation in most
of the above-mentioned literature is the so-called ￿ just compensation princi-
ple￿by which health inequalities that are not attributable to an individual￿ s
responsibility should be compensated by society. An obvious instance of
health inequalities that are not attributable to an individual￿ s responsibil-
ity are those inequalities due to congenital impairments. The ￿ just com-
pensation principle￿implies that society should do its best to alleviate the
consequences of congenital diseases in impaired infants.
There are some congenital impairments whose negative consequences
could be alleviated by means of an early detection and a subsequent treat-
ment. Typical examples are, for instance, congenital hearing impairment,
hypothyroidism or phenylcetonuria. For these cases, the implementation of
an early detection protocol seems to be su¢ ciently justi￿ed on the sole basis
of the ￿ just compensation principle￿ , even independently of its direct cost.
Indeed, early detection protocols can be deemed as an e¢ cient tool to avoid
future compensations to individuals su⁄ering from congenital impairments.
If the decision about the implementation of an early detection protocol
appears to be unquestionable, the selection of a particular protocol among
the alternatives to be implemented is, by no means, a straightforward deci-
sion. Usually, this decision is conducted by an economic evaluation of the
existing alternatives. The economic evaluation of health care programs in-
volves both technical and value judgements. This, and the special nature of
the commodity being considered, is the germ of the complexity of this prob-
lem whose multiple angles leave room for new techniques to be developed
with which we could face the problem. In this paper we present one of such
new techniques to address the evaluation of early detection protocols, also
known as screening programs.
Screening is traditionally de￿ned as testing a population of asymptomatic
individuals to identify precursors of a disease. The subjects who test posi-
tive are sent on for further evaluation in a subsequent diagnostic evaluation
to determine whether they do, in fact, have the disease. An implicit as-
sumption underlying the clinical interest of screening programs is that early
detection, before the development of symptoms, will lead to a more favor-
able prognosis. This is so because, by means of a screening, it is possible to
1treat the disease before it becomes clinically manifest, which is more e⁄ec-
tive than a later treatment. Usually, there are di⁄erent screening strategies
for a given disease. As mentioned above, we assume that the decision about
implementing one of them is taken up exogenously and the issue is to select
the best strategy to carry out, among the available ones.
The ￿rst problem that one has to face in order to run an economic eval-
uation of screening programs is the outcome measurement of the available
strategies. This is a major issue in the discipline of health economics, since
no measure has presented itself free of shortcomings and clearly superior to
the other existing ones. In a companion paper, Herrero & Moreno-Ternero
(2005a), we analyze the problem of selecting among screening programs,
making use of QALYs, possibly the most frequently employed measure in
health economics (e.g., Gold et al., 1996; Drummond et al., 1997; Dolan,
2000). It is a quite tractable measure and therefore easy to use. Neverthe-
less, it is both practically and conceptually dubious. The use of this mea-
sure is commonly associated with the assumption that health care resources
should be allocated so as to achieve the maximal health gain as measured
by additional QALYs. Many authors have raised concerns about the equity
implications of this allocation rule (e.g., Wagsta⁄, 1991; Bleichrodt et al.,
2004; ￿sterdal, 2005). It has also been argued that QALYs rely on very
restrictive assumptions on individual preferences (e.g., Drummond et al.,
1997; Dolan, 2000).
Here we propose evaluating newborn screening programs for a given con-
genital impairment by means of an opportunity analysis. By this we mean
computing the opportunities a newborn screening program o⁄ers to a ran-
domly given individual (i.e., the average opportunity the program o⁄ers). To
formalize our model we make use of a metric of opportunity. That is, we as-
sociate with each individual a unique number on a zero-one scale, interpret-
ing that number as the degree of the potential opportunities the individual
enjoys. This numerical measurement renders the subsequent analysis very
tractable analytically and, as we shall see later in the text, under some as-
sumptions, the opportunity analysis is robust to the particular metric being
considered.
For a given cohort of newborns susceptible of being impaired, we distin-
guish four reference groups after implementing a screening program: true
positives; false positives; true negatives; and false negatives. We assume
that individual opportunities do not vary within these four subgroups. The
expected opportunities of an individual when a screening is implemented
is the probability weighted sum of the opportunities in each of the four
groups. Since these are program-speci￿c probabilities, the expected oppor-
2tunities will di⁄er depending on the screening program being considered. If
we adopt as the ￿ status quo￿the absence of screening, we may identify as
the outcome of a screening program the potential opportunity gains it o⁄ers,
with respect to the status quo.
We formalize this model in the paper and show that the opportunity
analysis just described can be considerably simpli￿ed under some assump-
tions. More precisely, we show that under three assumptions; namely, (i) op-
portunities do not decrease ￿ per se￿by being referred to a screening program,
(ii) no di⁄erences in opportunities between healthy individuals with di⁄er-
ent test results, and (iii) opportunities of true positives are strictly larger
than those of false negatives (with a constant di⁄erence across screening pro-
grams), the outcome of a program can be seen as its level of sensitivity, i.e.,
the probability of ￿nding by the screening procedure a disability when it is
actually there. This implies that the conclusions of an opportunity analysis
of newborn screening programs, for a given disease, would not depend on
the particular metric of opportunity chosen, as long as this metric obeys
the three assumptions described above. This reinforces the interest of our
result.
The economic literature on the measurement of opportunity can be seen
as part of a more general attempt to establish non-welfarist foundations of
social choice (e.g., Peragine, 1999). Welfarism is the demand that the eval-
uation of any social state be based on the utilities generated in that state
(e.g., Sen, 1991). Much of the traditional social choice theory is welfarist
in the sense that the goodness of any social state is taken to depend, ul-
timately, only on the individual utilities or welfares of the people in that
state.1 The literature on the measurement of opportunity is an attempt to
give a more central place to the freedoms and liberties of individuals in the
determination of social welfare. Measuring the opportunities available to an
individual amounts to measuring an individual￿ s freedom of choice. Hence
the relevance of this literature from the egalitarian point of view, as opposed
to the concerns regarding the equity implications of QALY-based analysis
of health care programs, mentioned above.
In all the economic literature on the measurement of opportunity, how-
ever, di⁄erent measures are characterized by formal axioms usually justi￿ed
by casual appeals to intuition, without reference to any clear theoretical
position about what freedom of choice is and why it matters (e.g., Sugden,
1998). The, perhaps, most controversial question investigated in this litera-
1On the rationale of the welfarist approach, see Arrow (1951), Harsanyi (1955) and
Mirrlees (1982) among others.
3ture is that of linking a quantity-based measure of opportunity (what we call
a metric of opportunity) with some notion of the value of the available alter-
natives. Our main result in this paper shows that, under mild assumptions,
the opportunity analysis of newborn screening programs is immune to this
controversial question, as its conclusions are fairly robust to the particular
metric of opportunity being employed for the analysis.
We conclude the paper applying our model to the current debate on the
implementation of newborn hearing screening programs in some states of the
US and in some European countries. We show that, according to an oppor-
tunity analysis, universal programs are preferred to selective programs, in
which only newborns with a risk factor are screened. This conclusion agrees
with the more recent pediatric recommendations that have been published
(e.g., Joint Committee on Infant Hearing, 2000).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the basic
model of the opportunity analysis. The results for this model are presented
in Section 3. An application to the case of congenital hearing impairment
is taken up in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
We consider a particular congenital disease or impairment for which there
exist newborn screening programs that permit its early detection. We
assume that the early detection of the impairment, followed by an ade-
quate treatment, might reduce considerably its negative consequences. Let
N = f1;:::;ng be the corresponding cohort of newborns susceptible of being
impaired. The status of a newborn with respect to the disease is either d = 0
(if the infant is healthy) or d = 1 (if the infant is impaired). We denote by
￿ 2 [0;1] the prevalence of the disease in the cohort, i.e., the fraction of
impaired newborns in the cohort.2 We denote by G0 the set of newborns
with negative disease status and by G1 the set of newborns with positive
disease status. By construction, N = G0 [G1 and the number of newborns
in each of the subgroups is jG0j = (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ n and jG1j = ￿ ￿ n, respectively.
Newborns can be partitioned into four groups, according to whether they
do or do not have the disease and whether their screening tests are positive or
negative. Thus, there are four groups of newborns: true positives, newborns
whom the screening correctly indicates to have the disease; false positives,
those who do not have the disease but who have a positive screening test;
2If i denotes the number of impaired newborns in N then ￿ =
i
n. We interpret this
number as the probability of a newborn in the cohort being impaired.
4false negatives, those who have the disease but are mistakenly cleared by
the screening; and true negatives, those who do not have the disease and are
correctly identi￿ed as such by the screening.3 We can compute how likely an
individual would belong to each of the four groups by using characteristics
of the population (prevalence) and of the detection ability of the screening
test (sensitivity and speci￿city). The sensitivity of the screening test (￿1) is
the conditional probability that an individual with the disease is positively
detected by the test. The speci￿city of the test (￿2) is the conditional
probability of an individual without the disease being correctly detected as
negative in the test. Using these de￿nitions, the probability of an individual
being a true negative is the probability that she does not have the disease
(1 ￿ ￿) times the probability that the screening correctly indicates that she
does not have the disease (￿2). The probabilities of the individual to be a
true positive (￿￿1), a false positive ((1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿2)) and a false negative
(￿(1￿￿1)) can be similarly expressed. The advantage of this way of writing
the screening probabilities is that it makes easier to assess the implications




denote the set of available screening programs for
the early detection of the disease. Let s0 denote the ￿ status quo￿ , i.e., the
scenario without any screening program. For all j = 0;1;:::;m, each screen-









sensitivity and the speci￿city of sj respectively, and cj denotes the incre-
mental costs of the screening program with respect to the status quo.4 By
costs of a screening program, we mean the costs incurred by the test, i.e.,
technology and wages of the specialists who supervise it, and the costs of
the ￿nal diagnostic evaluation to which every positive infant is referred after
the screening test. It is worth noting that we assume all impaired individ-
uals receive diagnostic evaluation, regardless of whether their impairment
is detected early or not. Consequently, the incremental health-care cost of
implementing a screening program sj is
cj = cj
s + r ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿
j
2) ￿ cd, (1)
where c
j
s is the cost of the screening itself, r is the return rate and cd the
cost of the diagnostic evaluation.5
For ease of exposition, denote an infant￿ s test result in the screening
program sj as tj = 0 if it is negative, and as tj = 1 if it is positive. Then, for
3If there is no screening program being implemented then the group of false negatives
is G1, whilst G0 is the group of true negatives.
4From here onwards, unless otherwise stated, it is assumed that all costs are per capita.
5By return rate we mean the percentage of infants returned for follow-up testing.
5each sj 2 S, d 2 f0;1g and tj 2 f0;1g denote by G
j
(d;t) the group of infants
sharing disease status d and test result tj, after implementing sj. Thus, N










According to the notation introduced above, it is straightforward to see that
the probabilities of being in each of the groups are given by:
￿
j















(0;0) = (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿
j
2
Now, we compute the potential opportunities of each newborn. To do so,
we need a metric of opportunity. A metric of opportunity is a mapping
associating with each individual a unique number on a zero-one scale rep-
resenting the degree of potential opportunities, and interpreting 0 (1) as
the lowest (highest) possible degree of potential opportunities an individual
might face. Instances of metric of opportunity could be the probability of
attaining a minimum level of income, or a certain level of education, or even
a certain life expectancy above some level of good health. Formally, a metric
of opportunity is a function
￿ : f0;1g ￿ f0;1g ￿ S [ fs0g 7! [0;1],
where ￿(d;t;sj) 2 [0;1] denotes the degree of potential opportunities of an
individual with disease status d and a test result tj after implementing sj.
We de￿ne the degree of opportunity associated with each screening pro-






(d;t) ￿ ￿(d;t;sj), (3)
where ￿
j
(d;t) is the probability of being in G
j
(d;t). In other words, ￿j is the sum
of the degrees of potential opportunities associated with each group (true
positives, false positives, false positives and true negatives) multiplied by
the probability of an individual being in the group. In this respect, ￿j can
be interpreted as the expected opportunities of an infant after implementing
sj.
6In particular, the degree of opportunity associated with the ￿ status quo￿
comes determined by
￿0 = ￿ ￿ ￿(1;0;s0) + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿(0;0;s0). (4)
Consequently, the degree of opportunity gained, associated with a screening
sj 2 S, is O
j
￿ = ￿j ￿ ￿0.
3 The result
In this section we provide additional assumptions under which the opportu-
nity analysis described in Section 2 is independent of the metric of oppor-
tunity.
The ￿rst assumption says, roughly, that opportunities do not decrease
￿ per se￿by being referred to a screening program. In other words, the degree
of potential opportunities of a true (false) negative individual after imple-
menting a screening program coincides with the degree of potential oppor-
tunities of a healthy (impaired) individual in the status quo. Formally:
Assumption 1: For all sj 2 S we have
￿(0;0;sj) = ￿(0;0;s0), and ￿(1;0;sj) = ￿(1;0;s0).
The second assumption says that there are no di⁄erences in potential
opportunities between healthy individuals with di⁄erent test results, i.e.,
between a false positive and a true negative individual. Formally:
Assumption 2: For all sj 2 S we have
￿(0;1;sj) = ￿(0;0;sj).
The third assumption says that early detection of the disease is ad-
vantageous at an individual level, and that this individual improvement is
independent of the screening program chosen. That is, the degree of op-
portunity gained by an impaired infant after being detected by a screening
program is strictly positive and constant (although depending on the metric
of opportunity) for each program. Formally:
Assumption 3: For all sj 2 S we have
￿(1;1;sj) ￿ ￿(1;0;s0) = ￿(￿) > 0.
We have the following result:
7Theorem 1 If the metric of opportunity satis￿es assumptions 1, 2 and 3,
then the degree of opportunity gained that a screening program o⁄ers, ac-
cording to this metric, is its sensitivity, up to a (multiplicative) constant
factor.
Proof. Let ￿ be a metric of opportunity that satis￿es assumptions 1, 2 and
3. By (4),
￿0 = ￿ ￿ ￿(1;0;s0) + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿(0;0;s0).
Similarly, by (3), given a screening procedure sj 2 S, its degree of opportu-

































￿ = ￿j ￿ ￿0
= ￿
j
(0;0) ￿ (￿(0;0;sj) ￿ ￿(0;0;s0)) + ￿
j
(1;0) ￿ (￿(1;0;sj) ￿ ￿(1;0;s0)) +
￿
j
(0;1) ￿ (￿(0;1;sj) ￿ ￿(0;0;s0)) + ￿
j
(1;1) ￿ (￿(1;1;sj) ￿ ￿(1;0;s0))






(1;1) ￿ (￿(1;1;sj) ￿ ￿(1;0;s0)) = ￿ ￿ ￿
j
1 ￿ (￿(1;1;sj) ￿ ￿(1;0;s0)).
By Assumption 3, ￿(￿) = ￿(1;1;sj) ￿ ￿(1;0;s0) > 0, for all sj 2 S. Then,
O
j




k = k(￿;￿) = ￿ ￿ ￿(￿) > 0.
Note that k depends on the prevalence of the disease and the metric of
opportunity. It is not, however, screening program-speci￿c.
8It can be inferred from the proof of the theorem that both the degrees of
opportunity gained and the sensitivity levels of the programs yield the same
ranking of the available programs. The main relevance of Theorem 1 lies
therein; the ranking of the available newborn screening programs for a given
disease, according to the opportunities they o⁄er, does not depend on the
metric of opportunity that we decide to use, provided this metric obeys the
three assumptions introduced above. It is worth noting, nonetheless, that
the cardinal information of this ranking is captured by the constant (k) that
appears in the proof, which depends on the prevalence of the disease and
the metric of opportunity. Hence, we acknowledge that our result is only
informative when the analysis refers to screening programs for the same
disease. It cannot be used, however, to compare screening programs of
di⁄erent diseases.
To conclude with this section, one might argue that the model described
is extremely simple and somehow unrealistic. In particular, it only computes
the in￿ uence of su⁄ering a congenital disease on the potential opportunities
of a newborn and rules out any other key possible circumstances, such as gen-
der, race, parental socioeconomic status, level of formal education attained
by parents, etc., that also in￿ uence individual potential opportunities. The
model presented in this paper, however, can be easily enriched to account for
additional individual circumstances and their e⁄ect on the potential oppor-
tunities of a newborn. It can be shown that an analogous result to Theorem
1 would also be obtained in this generalized model, provided we generalize
accordingly the above three assumptions to this setting (i.e., referring to in-
dividuals with the same circumstances) as well as we include an additional
assumption saying that being identi￿ed as a true positive does not depend
on the remaining circumstances (e.g., Herrero and Moreno-Ternero, 2005c).
4 Application: the case of congenital hearing im-
pairment
We now apply our model to the particular case of congenital hearing im-
pairment. This is an impairment that satis￿es all the medical requirements
to impose a prevention program, based on a newborn screening protocol.
First of all, it is a serious impairment, for which a lack of early diagnosis
will cause problems in language acquisition. Signi￿cant hearing loss inter-
feres with the development of speech perception abilities needed for later
language learning. These impairments in communication skills can lead to
learning disabilities and ultimately, to limitations in career opportunities.
9Moreover, it is more frequent than other impairments for which newborn
screening programs are in use in developed countries. Finally, there are re-
liable screening methods, with high levels of sensitivity and speci￿city, and
there is also an e⁄ective treatment available. As a consequence, there is
a broad agreement to impose a newborn hearing screening program (e.g.,
Joint Committee on Infant Hearing, 2000).
Having reached this consensus, the debate moved to select between a uni-
versal and a selective alternative. In a Universal Newborn Hearing Screening
(￿UNHS￿ hereafter) every newborn is tested, whereas in a Selective New-
born Hearing Screening (￿SNHS￿hereafter) only those who were born with
a risk factor, such as being in the neonatal intensive care unit or having a
family history of hearing impairment, are tested. A UNHS is more expensive
but also more e⁄ective, since only 50% of newborns with a hearing impair-
ment belong to a group at risk. It is currently mandated in 32 states of
the United States. The SNHS, however, was and continues to be practiced
throughout the United States and the rest of the world (e.g., Keren et al.,
2002).
There is ample literature on choosing between UNHS and SNHS, espe-
cially from the medical viewpoint (see Joint Committee on Infant Hearing,
2000; Thompson et al., 2001; and the literature cited therein), but also from
an economic viewpoint (e.g., Kemper and Downs, 2000; Kezirian et al., 2001;
Keren et al., 2002; Herrero and Moreno-Ternero, 2005b). The aim of this
section is to apply our model to provide an additional viewpoint to this
current debate about choosing between the two alternatives. We think the
opportunity analysis we shall present next represents an achievement with
respect to the previous literature, as this literature fails to capture ethical
aspects when it comes to measuring bene￿ts associated with the implemen-
tation of screening programs.
4.1 Protocols
According to the recommendations of the Joint Committee on Infant Hear-
ing, every neonate should be tested by Otoacoustic Emissions (￿OAE￿here-
after), a less e¢ cient and expensive test that is thought to represent a re-
￿ ection of sound waves when sounds are presented to normal ears, and they
are not detected in ears a⁄ected by the large majority of types of hearing
loss in newborns. Those who fail this test should be referred to a subsequent
test (Auditory Brainstem Responses, ￿ABR￿hereafter), a more e¢ cient and
expensive test that presents sounds to the ear and detects nervous system
activity in speci￿c locations of the hearing pathway (Joint Committee on
10Infant Hearing, 2000).
This is, however, somewhat vague and imprecise as there exist di⁄erent
versions of both tests that are currently in practice in hospitals. For in-
stance, there are two alternative options based on OAE: transient evoked
otoacoustic emissions (TEOAE) and distortion product otoacoustic emis-
sions (DPOAE). Similarly, although complete automated ABR testing re-
mains the gold standard for determination of hearing loss, there is a shorter
screening version (S-ABR) being used, that is less expensive and quicker.
Consequently, we evaluate two slightly di⁄erent versions (combining some
of the alternatives mentioned above) of the universal 2-stage screening pro-
tocol recommended by the Joint Committee on Infant Hearing, for which
the medical literature has provided enough data to perform our analysis. In
the ￿rst version (protocol U1), we consider automated TEOAE and ABR
as described by Kemper and Downs (2000). In the second version (protocol
U2) we consider OAE tests as a single entity involving both TEOAE and
DPOAE, because, as argued by Kezirian et al. (2001), their cost and validity
have been similar to date. As a second stage, the ABR testing refers to the
shorter screening version (S-ABR) to obtain the precise protocol described
by Kezirian et al. (2001). Finally, there is a di⁄erent UNHS currently in
practice in a Spanish region (Navarra). In this case, the protocol has three
stages. The ￿rst stage consists on an OAE test to every newborn at the
third day of life, before leaving the nursery. For those who failed it, there
will be a second OAE at the ￿fteenth day of life. Finally, the third stage
involves a new OAE test for those neonates who failed the second stage and
return at the third month. We will refer to this protocol as U3.
A selective screening includes a previous stage with a high-risk criterion
(HRC), and then applies the protocol for infants at risk for congenital hear-
ing loss. We therefore have three alternative selective screening procedures,
which will be called S1, S2 and S3. Each protocol (selective or universal)
concludes with a diagnostic evaluation for those who failed after the last
stage.
To summarize, we focus our attention on six alternative early detection
programs. Table 1 shows the mean estimates of the general and speci￿c
data from each procedure (SQ refers to the status quo in which no screening
procedure exists). Additional information about such data, like their con￿-
dence intervals, can be obtained in Kemper & Downs (2000), Kezirian et al.
(2001) and Keren et al. (2002). Formally, following the notation of Section
2, let s0 denote the absence of , s1 (s2) [s3] the ￿rst (second) [third] UNHS
procedure, and s4 (s5) [s6] the ￿rst (second) [third] SNHS, based on high
11risk factors.
Table 1
Data of the screening procedures
Screening
Parameters SQ U1 U2 U3 S1 S2 S3
Sensitivity (￿
j
1) 0 :784 :902 :840 :463 :532 :496
Speci￿city (￿
j
2) 1 :996 :950 :995 :999 :998 :999
Direct cost (cj) 0 10:05 13:91 11:68 1:59 1:65 1:57
Prevalence (￿) :0011
4.2 Opportunity Analysis
We now move to the opportunity analysis based on our model presented
above. The assumptions of Section 3 are sound in the framework of newborn
hearing screening. Hence, the opportunity analysis can be reduced to the
study of the sensitivity of each program. Consequently, programs can be
ordered according to the degree of opportunity gained they o⁄er in the
following way:
U2 % U3 % U1 % S2 % S3 % S1,
where si % sj is to be read ￿program si o⁄ers a higher degree of opportunity
gained than program sj￿ .
For the sake of completeness, and to get additional information about
the cardinality of preferences over the set of alternatives, we provide an
opportunity analysis for a given metric of opportunity. We might think of
several metrics to deal with this task. Here, we consider the notion of degree
of potential success, introduced by Mariotti (2002), that particularly ￿ts this
example.
The basic idea provided by Mariotti is the de￿nition of success by means
of di⁄erent variables, reaching some minimal values. Success could be, for
instance, the attainment of a minimum level of income, or a certain level of
education, or even a certain life expectancy above some level of good health.
Our particular de￿nition of success in this example will be ￿living above
the poverty line￿ . The metric of opportunity ￿ is to be interpreted as the
probability for an individual of reaching success, i.e., the probability for an
individual of living above the poverty line.
To the best of our knowledge, no satisfactory database including infor-
mation about income and poverty within the population of hearing impaired
12exists. Here, in order to obtain a proxy for these data, we rely upon the On-
line Resource for U.S. Disability Statistics. This service provides statistics
calculated by the Cornell University Rehabilitation Research and Train-
ing Center on Disability Demographics and Statistics (StatsRRTC) using
data from the Current Population Survey (CPS), which is conducted by the
Census Bureau and the Bureau of Labor Statistics. In the CPS, persons
with a disability are those who have a ￿health problem or disability which
prevents them from working or which limits the kind or amount of work
they can do.￿In the year 2004, an estimated 25:5 (30:8) percent of civilian
non-institutionalized, men (women) with a work limitation, aged 18-64 in
the United States lived in families with incomes below the poverty line (cf.
Houtenville, 2005). In the same year, an estimated 7:8 (10:8) percent of
civilian non-institutionalized, men (women) without a work limitation, aged
18-64 in the United States lived in families with incomes below the poverty
line (cf. Houtenville, 2005). We shall use these numbers as a proxy for the
de￿nition of the metric of opportunity ￿.
We observe from the above data that gender is a key (or at least, rel-
evant) factor to determine the probability for an individual of living above
the poverty line. Thus, we use the generalization of our model, described
at the end of Section 3, to capture this additional circumstance. Formally,
let ￿(g;d;t;sj) denote the degree of potential opportunities of an individual
with gender g, impairment status d, and a test result t, after implementing
sj. Then, if m (f) means ￿ male￿(￿ female￿ ),
￿(m;0;1;sj) = ￿(m;0;0;sj) = ￿(m;0;0;s0) = 0:922,
and
￿(f;0;1;sj) = ￿(f;0;0;sj) = ￿(f;0;0;s0) = 0:892,
for all sj 2 S. Similarly,
￿(m;1;0;sj) = ￿(m;1;0;s0) = 0:745,
and
￿(f;1;0;sj) = ￿(f;1;0;s0) = 0:692,
for all sj 2 S.6 Finally, we assume that for those impaired individuals
who were detected by a screening program, probabilities are slightly higher.
There is some uncertainty about the precise magnitudes of the reductions
6Note that we are assuming here that the above numbers are independent of the screen-
ing program to which an individual was referred to (if she was referred at all). This is
precisely the content of Assumptions 1 and 2 introduced above in Section 3.
13in morbidity arising from earlier detection of congenital hearing impairment
although the bene￿ts are certainly positive (e.g., Thompson et al., 2001). We
model this fact by saying that the probability of living above the poverty line
for an impaired individual who was detected by a screening program is the















￿ = ￿j ￿ ￿0
= ￿
j
(f;0;0) ￿ ￿(f;0;0;sj) + ￿
j
(f;0;1) ￿ ￿(f;0;1;sj) ￿ ￿(f;0) ￿ ￿(f;0;0;s0) +
￿
j
(f;1;0) ￿ ￿(f;1;0;sj) + ￿
j
(f;1;1) ￿ ￿(f;1;1;sj) ￿ ￿(f;1) ￿ ￿(f;1;0;s0) +
￿
j
(m;0;0) ￿ ￿(m;0;0;sj) + ￿
j
(m;0;1) ￿ ￿(m;0;1;sj) ￿ ￿(m;0) ￿ ￿(m;0;0;s0) +
￿
j
(m;1;0) ￿ ￿(m;0;0;sj) + ￿
j
(m;1;1) ￿ ￿(m;0;1;sj) ￿ ￿(m;1) ￿ ￿(m;0;0;s0),
where ￿
j
(g;d;t) denotes the probability of being in the group of infants shar-
ing gender g, impairment status d and test result t, after implementing sj,
whereas ￿(g;d) denotes the probability of being in the group of infants sharing










￿(￿;m) = ￿(m;1;1;sj) ￿ ￿(m;1;0;s0) = 0:089,
and
￿(￿;f) = ￿(f;1;1;sj) ￿ ￿(f;1;0;s0) = 0:1,
Finally, we assume that 51:1% of the newborns are females.7 Let then
￿m = 0:489 and ￿f = 0:511. Since there is no reported evidence showing
7This is indeed the proportion of females in the US population in 2004 (e.g., U.S.
Census Bureau).
14that being identi￿ed as a true positive depends on the individual gender, we
assume that, for g = m;f, ￿
j
(g;1;1) = ￿g ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
j
1, where ￿ is the prevalence




￿ = 0:011 ￿ (0:489 ￿ 0:089 + 0:511 ￿ 0:1) ￿ ￿
j
1,
Table 2 shows the degree of opportunity gained each program o⁄ers.
Table 2
Degree of opportunity gained
Screening
Opportunity s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6
(O
j
￿) 0:000078 0:000090 0:000084 0:000046 0:000053 0:000050
5 Discussion
We have presented a new technique to select the best newborn screening
program, for a particular congenital impairment, out of a set of mutually
exclusive alternatives. Such a technique consists of evaluating screening
programs by means of the potential opportunity gains they o⁄er. In other
words, we use a ￿utilitarian/harsanyian￿social evaluation criterion with the
important modi￿cation that ￿utilities￿are interpreted as ￿opportunities￿ .
In doing so, we show that we can use the sensitivity as a proxy for the social
desirability of a screening programme, as the three assumptions on which
our theorem relies are more plausible under this interpretation.8
If ￿nancing is not an issue, we would advocate for implementing the
program that provides the highest potential opportunities. Now, in health
care, as in other areas of social policy, decisions have to be made concerning
the allocation of scarce resources. Usually, the program that yields the
highest degree of opportunity gained (i.e., the most e⁄ective program) is
also one of the most expensive programs (as it is indeed the case in our
application regarding congenital hearing impairment). If so, we recommend
8The reason for using a ￿utilitarian/harsanyian￿social evaluation function is that this
criterion has the unique virtue of being at the same time based on rationality at the
social level and respecting the Pareto principle (e.g., Harsanyi, 1955). A well known
drawback, nonetheless, of the utilitarian criterion is its indi⁄erence to ex-ante and ex-post
inequalities. Several alternatives could have been considered to face this problem, such as
taking a weighted sum of ex-ante and ex-post egalitarian criteria or introducing a measure
of ex-ante fairness in the measurement of individual opportunities, (e.g., Bleichrodt, 1997;
Fleurbaey, 2007).
15the following algorithm, inspired by the discipline of health economics (e.g.,
Johannesson and Weinstein, 1993; Birch and Gafni, 1993; Garber, 2000), to
address the trade-o⁄ between costs and e⁄ectiveness of these programs and
decide accordingly the program that has to be implemented.
(i) As a ￿rst step, programs that are strictly dominated, i.e., those for
which there exists another available program more e⁄ective and less expen-
sive, should be excluded.
(ii) In the case of mutually exclusive programs with a dedicated budget,
programs should be ranked according to e⁄ectiveness and then calculate
the incremental cost-e⁄ectiveness ratio for each successively more e⁄ective
program.
(iii) If any of these incremental ratios turns out to be less than the
previous one in the sequence of increasingly e⁄ective mutually exclusive
programs, then the less e⁄ective one is ruled out by extended dominance,
and it should never be implemented irrespective of the amount of resources
available.
This algorithm results in a sequence of programs with increasing incre-
mental cost-e⁄ectiveness ratios. The optimal decision rule is then to move
up the list of incremental ratios and implement successively more e⁄ective
(and expensive) programs until the resources are exhausted.9
The algorithm works as follows, for the application of congenital hearing
impairment considered in Section 4:
(i) Protocol s4 is strictly dominated by protocol s6 and therefore should
be excluded from the set of alternative options.10
(ii) The ranking of the remaining alternatives, according to their e⁄ec-
tiveness, is s2 % s3 % s1 % s5 % s6. Thanks to Theorem 1, it is straight-
forward to show that the incremental cost-e⁄ectiveness ratio of two given
programs si and sj is given by






where k is the constant factor appearing in the proof of Theorem 1. From
here, it is straightforward to see that R5;1 > R1;3. Thus, since s3 is more
e⁄ective than s1, we exclude s1 by extended dominance.
(iii) We therefore have four programs (s6;s5;s3;s2) with increasing in-
cremental cost-e⁄ectiveness ratios (R6;5 < R5;3 < R3;2). Thus, the optimal
9This decision rule applies under the assumption of divisibility of programs with con-
stant returns to scale (e.g., Birch and Gafni, 1993).
10Note that, thanks to Theorem 1, the relative e⁄ectiveness of the two programs can be
addressed just by looking at their sensitivity levels.
16choice would be to move up the list of incremental ratios and implement
successively more e⁄ective (and expensive) programs until the resources are
exhausted
Could we say, however, something more about our particular problem of
newborn hearing screening programs, without knowing the available budget
of resources? The answer is positive, as explained in what follows.
The economic evaluation of health care programs may be carried out
from the hospital￿ s perspective (including only health-care costs and ignoring
all others) or from the social perspective (including not only health-care
costs but also the costs arising from resources consumed in other sectors).
The decision about the perspective to be used is a matter of debate (e.g.,
Gold et al., 1996; Drummond et al., 1997; Johannesson and Meltzer, 1998).
An opportunity analysis as the one we present in this paper seems to be
only justi￿ed from a societal perspective. Thus, it is worth mentioning
that there are some (crucial) indirect costs associated to newborn hearing
screening programs that have not been addressed in our previous analysis
(e.g., special education or disability allowances). It turns out that, if we
adopt the societal perspective, and compute these indirect costs, then all the
programs being considered are cost-saving programs (an aspect that on its
own could solely justify the implementation of a newborn hearing screening
program, as opposed to the status quo). Now, if we rank programs according
to the whole stream of costs (actually savings) associated with them, then
we obtain the following:
U2 % U3 % U1 % S2 % S3 % S1,
which is precisely the ranking we o⁄ered in the opportunity analysis of Sec-
tion 4.11
To summarize, if we run an opportunity analysis (that discards any
information regarding costs) or a cost-opportunity analysis from the societal
perspective (in which we consider not only direct, but also indirect costs),
then we have a complete ranking of the set of available newborn hearing
screening programs. It is worth noting that, in particular, this ranking says
that universal programs are preferred to selective programs, as recommended
by the Joint Committee on Infant Hearing Statement. If, instead, we run
a cost-opportunity analysis from the hospital￿ s perspective (in which only
direct costs are considered) then the mechanism presented above tells us
the program we have to implement, as a function of the available resources
11See Herrero and Moreno-Ternero (2005b) for further details on the (indirect) costs
associated to these programs.
17we have. In any case, all the possible analyses are considerably simpli￿ed
thanks to our result, that makes the opportunity measurement robust to
changes in the metric of opportunity being considered.
To conclude, it is worth noting that, even though in this paper we ad-
dressed opportunities by means of a metric of opportunity, opportunities can
also be interpreted in terms of capability sets (e.g., Sen, 1985). In a health
care context, the capability set of a certain person is to be understood as the
set of health pro￿les achievable by this person. It is not her health outcome,
but rather, the set of her plausible health outcomes. The opportunities of
a person increase when her capability set becomes higher. This is precisely
what would happen for an impaired newborn whose impairment is detected
by means of a newborn screening program. The opportunity analysis pre-
sented here could have been easily adapted and framed in terms of capability
sets.
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